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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. What
"Legal

is

Tender

interest?
release

Statute"

Does
of

legal

tender
in

order

a conditional

the

within

and

what
to

draft

pending

satisfaction of the un-liquidated

is

required

terminate
which

law

the

contains

suit;

and,

under

our

running

of

a

complete

a

complete

judgment terminate interest on

a judgment that had never been entered?
2. In a replevin action, may the District Judge ignore the
Court approved Replevin Bond and ignore the approved Supersedeas
Bond

(Finance Company's Attorney

bonds

were

in

the

file)

recognized

(Tr-735 ) ; enter

that said approved
a

judgment;

issue a

garnishment; satisfy the judgment; all within three (3) days, in
violation

of

Rule

2.9

and

thereby

deprive

the

(defendants-

appellants), of their Utah Supreme Court award; and their right
to attack said judgments or to appeal said judgments?
3. Was

the

"Nunc Pro Tunc" judgment

made and

entered on

February 5, 1982 dating said judgment back to December 4, 1981 a
void

judgment? Did said

retroactive

judgment defeat defendants

right of appeal in that Rule 2.9 was never complied with?
4.

Was

the

"Nunc

Pro

Tunc"

judgment

granting

$2,500.00

Attorney fees, without supporting evidence, void?
5. Was the granting of an additional $1,000.00 attorney fees
for

appellate

work

claimed

to

have

been

done

on

an

appeal

allowable under Utah law? When said case was never appealed to
the Supreme Court!

6.

Great Equity Insurance Company should pay all attorneys

fees in that the Insurance company was the wrongdoer.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
1.

The Utah Supreme Court ordered a judgment to be entered

in favor of the defendants-appellants Hector Martinez and IVknuel
Rivera. See case No. 18072, filed

May 24, 1983. (Tr-534)

This

judgment was not entered until June 23, 1986. Hector Martinez and
Manuel Rivera, appellants and defendants, herein, maintain that
under these circumstances Judge Conder erred in ignoring:
(a) The Replevin bond and the Supersedeas bond in the file.
See (Tr-IOOA); (Tr-103); (Tr-599-601)
(b) Judge Conder, in an attempt to frustrate the defendants
judgment and right to appeal, violated Rule 2.9.
(c)

In this case, said judgment and order was entered on

June 23, 1986 (Tr-688-712 inclusive). Without notice, the Court
then permitted

the issuance of a garnishment on the same day,

(June 23, 1986).
(d)
whatsoever
from

Then the Court, within three days, without any Notice
to Defendants, accepted an answer to the garnishment

the Insurance Company prepared by William J.

Insurance Company's Counsel, and

entered

Hansen, the

a garnishee

judgment

thereon on the 26th day of June 1986. The Court again, without
notice to the defendants, made and entered a garnishee judgment;

2

and

immediately

satisfied

said

judgment.

inclusive. This wrongful conduct resulted

See

(Tr-688

to

712)

in the taking of the

defendants money judgment, which was ordered entered by the Utah
Supreme Court, and, handing it over to General Motors Acceptance
Corporation
supposedly

summarilylost.

See

while

the

(Tr-707).

file

was

Violating

concealed

Rule

2.9

in

and
its

entirety.
(e)
an

abuse

intended

The Finance Company and the Insurance Company committed
of
to

process
appeal

in

said

that

they

cause

a

knew

Notice

that
of

the

Intent

defendants
to

Appeal

(Tr-706) having been mailed to all parties on the 26th day of
June, 1986, and said file having therein a good and sufficient
Replevin Bond
Bond

(Tr-58;59) and a good and sufficient

Supersedeas

(Tr-599-601); (Said sureties having been duly examined and

accepted by the Court Tr-IOOA.)
THE "NUNC PRO TUNC" JUDGMENT
2. In regard
Hector

Martinez

to the

and

"Nunc Pro Tunc" judgment, defendants

Manuel

Rivera's

counsel

was

completely

misled concerning a supposed hearing that was to be held December
2, 1981; on this date the entire cause was on appeal to the Utah
Supreme Court; said cause having been appealed

on October 19,

1981; the file was devoid of any judgments until February 5, 1981
(Tr-539). In addition to the deception, The Finance company had
failed to present any evidence of attorneys fees to either the

3

Court or the jury. It was defendants position

that the Finance

Company had waived their attorneys fees; there was no judgment or
order in the file; no notices of the "Nunc Pro Tunc" judgments
were ever served on the defendants after their signing.. When the
defendants
judgment

were

had

alerted

been

to

entered

the
the

fact

that

defendants

a

"Nunc

right

to

Pro

Tunc"

appeal

or

challenge said judgment had long expired. Jay V. Barney states in
his

brief

(February,

1984)

Page

5;:

"Judge

Conder,

in

the

presence of Counsel, signed the judgment and order as December 4,
1981, but indicated
signature

as

"Nunc Pro Tunc" and designated his date of

"2/5/82;"

Mr

Barney

certainly

knew

that

"back-dating" of the judgment was in complete violation of Rule
2.9.

No notice of this signing was given to the appellants or

their attorney.
THE GRANTING OF ATTORNEYS FEES HEREIN
3. Judge Conder erred in granting attorneys fees which are
not supported by any evidence? The affidavit filed to support the
attorneys
counsel

fees stated

is entitled

only a bare

to $2,500.00.

conclusion; totally un-supported

conclusion

that

plaintiff's

Said affidavit being a mere

by any facts or any evidence;

and should render the judgment void.
4.

Judge Conder erred in granting of additional attorneys

fees of $1,000.00 upon a case which was not appealed to the Utah
Supreme Court, and, the granting of attorneys fees that was not

4

for work done but was of a punitive nature? Said additional grant
was not supported by any facts or evidence and should be declared
void.
5.

Any

and all

attorneys

fees

should

be

paid

by Great

Equity Insurance Company. Great Equity breached their contract.
Great Equity Insurance Company failed to make the payments after
Hector

Martinez became

totally disabled; Great

Equity was the

wrong doer.

THE TERMINATING OF THE RUNNING OF INTEREST
5. Judge Conder erred in terminating the running of interest
on a Supreme Court Order to enter judgment; said judgment having
not been entered when the tender was supposedly made. In addition
thereto,

the draft

release,

and

was

which

a conditional

stated

satisfied a non-existent

that

by

draft

which

endorsement

contained

it

a

supposedly

judgment; the draft further stated and

released Great Equity Life Insurance of any and all claims that
existed among
was

ever

the parties. Under these circumstances no tender

made;

and,

the

draft

was

mailed

to

General

Motors

Acceptance Corporation, and their attorney, Jay V. Barney, and
was never tendered to Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera or Mark S.
Miner, their attorney, in that said draft was never delivered to
these defendants or

their

attorney;

when Hector

Martinez and

Manuel Rivera were advised by letter that Jay V. Barney possessed

5

the

draft

said

draft

was

summarily

rejected

by

returning

the

draft for costs and rejecting all drafts not tendered.(Tr-652)
6. The foregoing

facts give rise to the

issue -

May the

Court terminate interest by holding that there was a legal tender
under

Section 78-27-1, Utah Code Annotated, when said

judgment

was was never entered; and, the written offer to pay or deliver
contained
draft

therein a release, and a recitation stating that the

satisfied

all

unliquidated

judgment

and

released

Great

Equity Insurance company of all pending claims and suits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is a replevin action (Tr-2).

General Motors Acceptance

Corporation sought to replevy and take an automobile purchased by
Hector Martinez. Hector Martinez suffered complete kidney failure
and was using the automobile to drive to the University Hospital
for dialysis three times a week.

In order to prevent the taking

of the Chevrolet car by the Finance Company, Hector Martinez and
his father, Manuel Rivera, filed a good and sufficient replevin
bond with the court and the sureties were duly justified by the
court (Tr-59).
and

is

in

full

This bond is in the file and is in good standing
force

and

effect

and

was

duly

accepted

and

approved by the Finance Company (Tr-103).
The replevin action was tried by Judge Dean Conder, who
entered judgment against the defendants (Tr-291).

This judgment

was appealed October 19, 1981 (Tr-326) and reversed by the Utah

6

Supreme Court May 24, 1983; see Case No. 18072. On February 5,
1982, without notice to the defendants, Judge Dean Conder entered
a

"Nunc Pro Tunc"

Rivera

in

the

judgment against Hector

amount

of

$4,717.00

and

Martinez and Manuel
a

further

amount

of

$2,500.00 attorneys fees and court costs of $127.00 (See Tr-539)
This

judgment was entered

in complete violation of Rule 2.9 of

District Court Rules, in that no notice that

the judgment had

been signed was given to defendant-appellants herein; and since
the defendants received

no notice of this judgment until after

their time to appeal had expired, no appeal was taken from this
"Nunc Pro Tunc" judgment, and therefore this judgment should be
found to be a void judgment.
On August 15, 1983, the Finance Company's counsel moved the
Court for an additional $1,000.00 attorneys fees for work alleged
to have been performed on appeal in the case in chief of GMAC v.
Hector Martinez.

This portion of the case was never appealed;

regardless of this fact, Judge Dean Conder granted the Finance
Company's
work

attorney

done

counsel
(Tr-579).

on

failed

an

appeal
to

additional
and

the

appear

at

$1,000.00

further
the

attorneys

reason

September

"that
1,

fees

for

defendants

1983

hearing"

On October 13, 1983, counsel for Hector Martinez and

Manuel Rivera appealed the granting of the additional $1,000.00
attorneys
issue

fees to the Utah

is now a proper

Supreme

Court, promptly, and this

issue in this case.

7

The effect of the

District

Court

judgment

allowing

an

additional

$1,000.00

attorneys fees was to increase the void "Nunc Pro Tunc" judgment
of $2,500.00 attorneys

fees.

See

(Tr-539) awarded February 5,

1982; to $3,500.00 for appellate work on a case that was never
appealed!

See

(Tr-549). See also the combined notices that the

hearing would be postponed to September 22, 1983 (Tr-551;556) and
see also (Tr-559;560 ).
FACTS CONCERNING THE TERMINATING OF INTEREST ARE AS FOLLOWS
(Tr-670)
On June 23, 1986, the District Court terminated the running
of interest on the Utah Supreme Court judgment by reason of an
alleged offer to settle and terminate the above-entitled cause by
the Great Equity Insurance Company, allegedly made on November 7,
1983 (Tr-690). The judgment recited that "the offer in writing on
November

7, 1983," was a tender

78-27-1, Utah Code Annotated,
case.

On

attorney

November
mailed

a

7,

1983,

draft

to

under

1953
Great
Jay

V.

the meaning of

(Tr-690).
Equity
Barney

Such

is not the

Insurance
in

Section

the

Company's
amount

of

$6,135.36 payable to Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera, and their
attorney Mark S. Miner; and GMAC and its attorney, Jay V. Barney.
(This draft was never delivered to, handed

to, or tendered to

Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera or Mark S. Miner.)
also

(Tr-670;671. )

On

this

date, November

See (Tr-673)

7, 1983, the Utah

Supreme Court judgment was totally unliquidated.

On this date,

November 7, 1983, the Utah Supreme Court judgment which was then

8

and

there in effect

read: "The judgment of the trial Court is

reversed and the case is remanded for entry of judgment against
Great Equity and in favor of Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera."
The

issue of attorneys

(Tr-607).
was

fees and costs was

still pending. See

Please note, that the draft delivered to Jay V. Barney

conditioned

upon

Hector

Martinez

and

Manuel

Rivera

terminating their suit against Great Equity Insurance Company and
delivering

to

Great

Equity

satisfaction of a non-entered

Insurance

Company

judgment (Tr-670).

a

complete

Regardless of

this, Judge Dean Conder entered an order on June 23, 1986, that
Great

Equity

interest

Insurance

to Hector

Company

Martinez and

"has
Manuel

no

responsibility

Rivera

for

from and after

November 7, 1983." (Tr-580) The Supreme Court's judgment granting
interest was summarily terminated under the claim that there was
a "purported" tender.
On November 7, 198 3, in fact, no tender was ever made.

The

facts are Great Equity Insurance Company mailed a draft to Jay V.
Barney

in

the

amount

of

$6,135.36

(Tr-670).

This

draft

was

conditioned

upon all parties, including Hector Martinez, Manuel

Rivera and

JNferk S. Miner, their attorney, giving Great

Equity

Insurance Company a complete release of all claims and all causes
of action against Great Equity Insurance Company.

This draft was

made out to General Motors Acceptance Corporation; Jay V. Barney,
their

attorney;

Hector

Martinez;

9

Manuel

Rivera

and

their

their

attorney;

Hector

attorney, Mark S. Miner.

Martinez;

Manuel

Rivera

and

their

This check was never mailed to Mark S.

Miner, in fact, it never left Jay V, Barney's office.

At this

time, November

against

Great Equity

7,

1983, no

judgment had

been

entered

Insurance Company by the District Court and there

was no judgment to be satisfied.

The draft provided, in addition

to a complete release of any and all claims and causes of action,
that all judgments against Great Equity Insurance Company would
be duly satisfied.

This tender was void

judgment entered to be satisfied.
numerous

motions pending before

in that there was no

also on this date, there were
the District

Court.

The only

draft that was mailed to the defendants and their attorney was
one for court costs

(Tr-648);

returned

Irregardless of the foregoing rejection of

forthwith!

this draft

for court costs was

any offers or any tenders; Judge Dean Conder ruled on June 23,
1986, that there was a tender made on November 7, 1983, and that
Great

Equity's

accruing

interest

on

the

judgment,

which

was

ordered entered by the Utah Supreme Court, was terminated as of
November 7, 1983.

An immediate appeal was taken from this order

and judgment; and, this is one of the critical issues before the
Court.

1Q

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
78-27-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

An offer in writing to

pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument
or specific personal property, is, if not accepted, equivalent to
the actual

production

and

tender

of

the

money,

instrument or

property.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera, his father, defendants,
appeal from multiple orders and judgments which have been entered
by Judge Dean Conder, while the above-entitled cause was pending
in the Utah Supreme Court.
General
non-payment

See 668 P 2d 498 (1983); (Tr-536).

Motors Acceptance Corporation

sued defendants

for

of automobile loan in a replevin action; defendant

Hector Martinez having lost both kidneys, brought a third-party
complaint

against

Great

Equity

disability insurance policy.

Insurance

Company

to

enforce

Judge Conder entered judgment as a

matter of law against the defendant in favor of General Motors
Acceptance Corporation
Martinez.

This

and against

September

23,

1981

the totally disabled Hector
judgment

was

appealed

and

reversed (Tr-607). On February 5, 1982 a "Nunc Pro Tunc" judgment
was signed and entered dating the judgment back to December 4,
1981.
that

No appeal was taken from this "Nunc Pro Tunc" judgment in
it

defendant

was
or

entered
their

"Nunc

Pro

Tunc"; without

counsel; retroactively

11

notice

dating

the

to

the

judgment

back

to

December

4,

1981.

See

(Tr-539).

Thereby

depriving

defendants of their right to appeal; and enlarging the rights of
GMAC , by

making

a

judgment

that

could

not

be

attacked

or

appealed. See Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2nd 382; 370 P 2d 28.
In the case in chief, the Utah Supreme Court held that Great
Equity Insurance Company was estopped from denying the disabled
Hector Martinez coverage under the policy.

The case was remanded

"for entry of

Great

judgment

and

costs against

favor of defendants." (Tr-607;534)

Equity and

in

No judgment was entered until

June 23, 1986; at which time Judge Dean Conder by an order, again
retroactively

terminated

interest

on

the

non-entered

ordered

judgment as of November 7, 1983; and he did by order and judgment
re-enter the "Nunc Pro Tunc" judgment of February 5, 1982; and he
did add another $1,000.00 (One Thousand Dollars) attorneys fees
for appellate work making the total judgment $3,500.00. (Tr-690).
See Utah State Building Board v. Walsh Plumbing, 16 Utah 2d 382;
399 P 2d 141; See also Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P 2d
974.
Defendants appealed

from February

5, 1981

"Nunc Pro Tunc"

judgment and from the September 27, 1983 judgment on October 13,
1983.

On December 12, 1985, the Utah Supreme Court remanded said

cause back to the Trial Court for entry of judgment as set forth
in a prior decision. See (Tr-607). With the further instruction
that

all pending

issues

were

to be

12

ruled

upon and after

all

matters and issues were adjudicated and after an Order certifying
that Rule 54 (b) had been complied with; defendant and appellants
would be entitled to a further appeal on all final judgments.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING INTEREST ON SUPREME
COURT JUDGMENT (TR-690).
The November
attorney

7, 1983, transaction between William Hansen,

for Great Equity Insurance Company and Jay V. Barney,

attorney for GMAC was not a tender under Section 78-27-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 (Tr-690h
There

was

no

tender

made

on November

7, 1983, by

Great

Equity Insurance Company to the defendants, Hector Martinez and
Manuel Rivera. On November 7, 1983, Great Equity Life Insurance
Company

mailed

a draft

Barney, the attorney

in the amount of $6,135.36, to Jay V.

for General Motors Acceptance Corporation;

this conditional draft was never presented
the defendants herein.

to Mark S. Miner or

This conditional draft was made out to

GMAC, Jay V. Barney, Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera and Mark S.
Miner.
of

This check was conditional upon receiving a Satisfaction

judgment

from

Hector

Martinez,

Manuel

Rivera

and

Mark

S.

Miner. No judgment had been entered, and there was no judgment to
be satisfied. The tender was void. The Supreme Court of the State
of Utah ordered and directed that a judgment be rendered, made
and entered, in favor of Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera and
against Great Equity Life Insurance Company.
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The Supreme Court's

order

was never

There

was

carried out and no judgment was ever

pending

before

concerning the judgment

the

entered.

Trial

Court

numerous

motions

that attorneys

fees.

See December 12,

1985 decision (Tr-607).
A tender, to be good, must be free from any conditions which
the tender does not have the right to insist upon.
v. White, supra.

See Sieverts

The conditions which Great Equity Insurance did

not have the right to insist upon were as follows:
(1)

The

satisfaction

of

a

judgment

which

had

not

been

determined and which was unliquidated.
(2)

Great

Equity

Insurance

demanded

a

satisfaction

of

judgment and a dismissal with prejudice of the defendants lawsuit
which

was

then

and

there

pending before

Attorneys fees, interest and costs.

the Court

concerning

See the Utah Supreme Court

Decision which returned and remanded said cause to the District
Court for the purpose of having a proper

judgment entered; said

judgment to include attorneys fees, interest and costs.
(3) The Court will note that the draft was never tendered to
or given to Hector
Mark S. Miner.

Martinez, Manuel Rivera or

their attorney,

The payees were Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera,

Mark S. Miner, GMAC, and their attorney, Jay V. Barney. The draft
required a full and complete release of all claims and dismissal
of

all

actions

against

Great

judgment from Mark S. Miner.

Equity

and

a

satisfaction

of

See (Tr-670). On November 28, 1984,
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the

draft

was

returned

to William

J.

Hansen, he having

been

informed that the defendants would not accept the draft under the
conditions described and insisted upon by the insurance company.
The Court will note that at no time were there any tenders,
offers, checks or drafts given to or offered to Hector Martinez,
Manuel

Rivera

or

their

attorney,

Mark

S.

Miner,

with

the

exception of a draft for court costs which was returned by reason
of

it

being

$6,135.36.

connected

to

and

made

part

of

the

voucher

for

The court costs, in this case, have never been paid

and remain outstanding. (Tr-648-651)

The offer of Great Equity

Insurance Company to terminate the lawsuit was promptly rejected
by reason of the unreasonable conditions that were attached to
the tender.
(4) At the time the draft was mailed to Jay V. Barney, there
was pending before the Trial Court numerous motions all of which
were concerned
matters

were

with

the proper

pending,

to

Martinez and Manuel Rivera
Utah Supreme Court.

tender

attorneys
had

been

were

wit:

on

judgment; while

October

appealed

13,

all pending

1983,

these
Hector

issues to the

Notice of Appeal, a Docketing Statement and

a Designation of Record
their

entry of

was properly

aware

rejected.

of

the

These

served.

fact

that

defendants

All parties and
the
had

conditional
always

acted

promptly and have never waived any rights pending the hearing of
the matters referred to the District Court by the Supreme Court.

15

Section

78-27-1

is

a

statute

performance of a legal tender.

which

requires

strict

See 52 Am. Jur. 215, 231, Tender,

Sections 2 and 24; also See Sieverts v. White, supra., and cases
cited therein.
Section

See also 62 CJ 670 Section 38; 36 CJS Tender,

27; Woods v. Dixon, 193 OR 628, 240 P 520; Radalj v.

Union Savings and Loan, 59 WYO 140, 138 P 2d 984, 141 P 2d 856.
The

Great

judgment

Equity
which

was

Insurance
granted

Company
Hector

had

no

right

Martinez

and

to

pay

Manuel

the

Rivera

directly over to GMAC and their attorney, Jay V. Barney, when the
Utah

Supreme Court

had

ordered

the entry

of

judgment

Great Equity Insurance Company and in favor of Hector

against
Martinez

and Manuel Rivera along with instructions for the lower Court to
re-examine
(Tr-609).

the

issue

of

attorneys

fees,

interest

and

costs

The tender made by Great Equity Insurance Company was

not made in good faith and was not made in a manner as to most
likely, under

the circumstances, benefit

the defendant, Hector

Martinez herein; in fact the tender only benefited
Company and

GMAC. Hector

Martinez and Manuel

the Finance

Rivera

could

have accepted same without suffering irreparable damage.

not

See K &

M Inc. v. LeCuyer, Cal. App., 233 P 2d 569; 107 Cal. App. 2d 710,
238 P 2d 28; 107 Cal. App. 2d 845, 238 P 2d 33.
The District Court Judge took a personal offense to being
reversed by the Utah Supreme Court (Tr-741).
The Court:
"I don't think they (Utah Supreme Court) ruled
you (Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera) should have been paid, they
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(Utah Supreme Court) simply ruled that your client should have
been notified of a limitation. Wasn't that all they held?"
Mr. Miner: "No sir. They said you were to enter judgment * *
* * * in favor of Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera and against
Great Equity."
The Court: "What about that, Mr. Barney. How are you going
to collect on a check if there has never been a judgment entered
on it?"
Mr. Barney: "Well that was my first Motion before the Court,
your Honor." (Tr-742, April 8, 1986.)
So what did the Court do?
signed

the order

that

Judge Conder, on June 23, 1986,

plaintiffs

were entitled

to a

judgment

against the Great Equity Life Insurance Company in the amount of
$4,717.50, with interest, until fully paid, together with costs
of court and attorneys fees in the sum of $3,500.00, that Hector
Martinez and
Equity

Life

interest
$742.85

Manuel

Insurance

thereon
and

Rivera

up

Ordered

Company
to
and

Decreed

Hector

Martinez

consequence

of

June

directly
further

to General
entered

in

November

circumvent

the

are granted

and

23,

Motors

the
7,

judgment
sum

1983

that

of

Manuel

court
Equity

Rivera;

1986 proceedings,

Acceptance

costs

of

Life

may

and,

pay

Corporation.

a Satisfaction of Judgment

Great

$4,717.50, with

and

Great

against

in which

the

as

a

money

The Court
the Court

satisfied the judgment that Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera had
against Great Equity Insurance Company (Tr-697;698). All of these
acts were done

in complete

violation

of

Rule

2.9 and without

notice and knowledge of Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera, the
defendants herein and by these "secret" summary proceedings; the
defendants were deprived of their Supreme Court judgment, along
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with;

their

right

to

file

proper

appeal t h i s questionable conduct.
done

in

complete

Supersedeas

disregard
Bonds

motions

All of

to

the

which

( T r - 5 8 ; 5 9 ; 6 0 ; 5 9 9 - 6 0 1 . ) Defendants

the

their

foregoing

Replevin

were
pray

and

in
that

the
these

Bond

right

to

acts

were

and

the

file.
judgments

See
be

reversed.

THE AWARD OF ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ATTORNEYS FEES FOR
SERVICES RENDERED ON APPEAL, WHEN THE CASE WAS NEVER APPEALED,
SHOULD BE SET ASIDE
The
attorneys

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

fees should be awarded

consistently
unless

held

that

no

they are supported by

evidence of necessity and reasonableness. See Walker v. Sandwick,
548 P 2d 1243 (Utah

1966); Wallace v. Build, Inc., 16 Utah 2d

401, 402 P 2d 699; Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Company, 537
P 2d 1039.

The record is devoid of any supporting evidence to

support attorneys fees.
stricken and denied.

It is clear that a fee must be supported by

evidence in the record.
485 P 2d 1044.

This portion of the judgment should be

See Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113,

The award of attorneys fees must be based upon

evidence produced in the case in chief and not after. See Gardner
v. Christiansen, 622 P 2d 782. The affidavits submitted by GMAC
Finance Company

were

nothing

more

than

mere

conclusions.

The

transcript and record herein is devoid of any evidence concerning
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1.

The ability of the attorney.

2.

The difficulty of the problems involved.

3.

The rate charged per hour.

4.

The number of hours put in on the case.

5.

The amount

of

money

sued

for. In fact, there

is no

evidence to support a judgment for $3,500.00 attorneys fees.
Richard v. Hodson, supra, also Walker v. Sandwick, supra.

See

Hector

Martinez and Manuel Rivera and their counsel, Mark S. Miner, were
never given the opportunity to attack the issue of attorneys fees
during the trial nor at any time thereafter.
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY SHOULD PAY ATTORNEYS
FEES
Great Equity Life Insurance Company wrongfully

refused to

make payments as made and provided by the insurance policy even
though the policy was current, as far as premiums are concerned
and Hector Martinez made all payments under the contract until he
was totally disabled. All notices, doctor's reports and necessary
papers were properly filed.

All insurance premiums were paid in

full (Tr-20).

The insurance company had thirty days to accept or

reject

Martinez as

Hector

an

insured

(Tr-25).

company denied coverage under the policy eight
the loss occurred
force

and

effect

(Tr-163).
when

the

The

The

insurance

(8) months after

insurance policy was in full

loss occurred; hence, Great

Equity

should pay for all defaults including attorneys fees, (see Seigel
v. William E. Bookholtz, 419 Fed 2d 720, 723 (DC Circuit, 1969).
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In this case, there was little or no investigation.
did

manifest

steady

determination

decision; and, for nine

to

abide

by

The company
its

contrary

(9) months they procrastinated with the

delayed investigation which ultimately resulted in the insurance
company leaving the ailing Hector Martinez helpless and nine (9)
months

in arrears

withdrawal
Company

and

in payments

denial

failed

to

of

his

comply

as

a

result

claim.

with

the

of

Great
terms

the

insurer's

Equity

Insurance

of

the

insurance

contract. The insurance company failed to live up to the standard
of conduct commensurate with the public nature of the insurance
business.

Great

insurance, and

Equity

not

only

thereby wronged

failed in its public duty.

breached

its

their

insured, but

contract

of

it completely

See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance

Company, 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P 2d 141, 146, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482
(1979). See also Dinkings v. American National Insurance Company,
92 Cal. App. 3d 222, 154 Cal. Rptr. 775, which held
insured

is entitled

to recover

that the

that portion of attorneys

fees

necessary and attributable to recover the amount due under the
policy.

Great

Equity

contract

should pay any and all attorneys fees that have been

incurred in this suit.
nature.

Their

Insurance

Company

having

breached

the

Insurance companies are quasi public in

obligations

expectations

of

coverage.

unreasonably,

and

in

go

violation

beyond
The
of
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meeting

insurance
its

public

the

reasonable

company
duties

acted
and

its

responsibilities,
attorneys

fees

therefore,

incurred

Miner, testified

it

should

herein.

be

responsible

Defendants

for

attorney,

in open court as to the time spent

the

Mark S.

in court,

pre-trial procedures, preparing the instructions (Tr-757).
THE "NUNC PRO TUNC" JUDGMENT SHOULD BE DECLARED VOID
"Nunc Pro Tunc" is Latin, meaning now for then.
phrase applied

to acts allowed

It is a

to be done after the time when

they should be done, with a retroactive effect, i.e., with the
same effect as if regularly done.

Perkins v. Hayward, 132 Ind.

95, 31 N.E. 670.
A "Nunc Pro Tunc" entry is an entry made now, of something
which

was actually previously

former date.

done, to have

effect

as of

the

Its office is not to supply omitted action by the

court, but to supply an omission in the record of action really
had

where

entry

thereof

was

omitted

through

inadvertence

or

mistake. Perkins v. Perkins, 225 Mass. 392, 114 N.E. 713.
A judgment "Nunc Pro Tunc" may not enlarge the rights or a
party nor may it be used to reduce a prescribed time period of to
defeat the right to take an appeal.
Utah

State

instant

Building

Board

v. Walsh

case

GMAC

gave

judgment

had

been

signed, hence,

enlarged

and

the

appeal.

It was

no

notice

defendants

long after

See Kettner v. Snow, supra;

were

Plumbing,
that

"Nunc

the Plaintiff's
deprived

the defendants
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the

supra.

of

In

Pro
rights

their

the

Tunc"
were

right

to

right of appeal had

expired

before

the

defendants

learned

of

the

signing

of

the

"February 5, 1982" judgment. Rule 2.9 of the District Court Rules
was

grossly

notice

violated

by

of the signing of

the plaintiff herein. Certainly
the

judgment

was given

until

there was

no

judgment which could be appealed from. The file is devoid of any
notice hence the "Nunc Pro Tunc" judgments should be held to be
void.
CONCLUSION
The June 23, 1986 Order and Judgment violated Rule 2.9 of
the District Court Rules and should be set aside. The "Nunc Pro
Tunc" judgment was a void judgment and should be held to be void.
The

judgment

for attorney fees is void

in that

it awards

appellate fees for a case that was never appealed; in addition
thereto, the record is devoid of any evidence of work done or the
reasonable value thereof.
Respectfully submitted,

fofcjU.fej.
MARK S .

MINER

Attorney for Defendants
Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone 363-1449
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid

four true

and correct copies of the foregoing Appellants Brief on Appeal
this

/ 2 ^

day of November, 1986, to:
Jay V. Barney, Esq.
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
General Motors Acceptance Corporation

William J. Hansen, Esq.
900 Kearns Building
Salt lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant-Respondent
Great Equity Life Insurance Company

And, that all interested parties were duly served according
to law.

MARK S. MINER
Attorney for the Defendants
Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone 363-1449

ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT "A"

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

~—00O00
General Motors Acceptance
Corporation, a New York
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

No* 18072
F I L E D
May 24, 1983

v*
Hector Martinez and Manuel M.
Rivera f
Defendants and Appellants,

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

v*
Great Equity Life Insurance
Company of Chicago, Illinois;
Streator Chevrolet Company,
Incorporated, Al Barrutia,
Brent H. Jensen, and E. C.
Ros©borough,
Third-Party Defendants
and Respondents*

STEWART, Justice:
.This is an action by General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) for repossession of an automobile and for damages
arising from the defendant's default on his promissory note
given for the purchase of the automobile. Defendant, Hector
Martinez, and his father, Manuel M. Rivera, filed, a third-party
complaint against Great Equity Insurance Co* to enforce a
credit insurance policy written to insure the amount of the
loan after Martinez 9 default because of illness* The trial
court entered judgment in favor of GMAC and against Martinez
and Rivera, and against Martinez and Rivera on their thirdparty complaint against Great Equity. The only issue on
this appeal is whether a pre-existing illness clause in the
insurance policy excluded Hector Martinez from coverage
under the policy*
On September 12, 1978, Hector Martinez purchased an
automobile on a conditional sales contract from Streator
Chevrolet. Martinez was told that as a condition of obtaining a financing contract he had to purchase a credit life and
disability insurance policy from Great Equity* The policy
designated Martinez as the insured and Streator as the
beneficiary, and provided that if because of death, accident,
or illness Martinez was unable to make his car payments,
Great Equity would pay the remainder of the debt then owing.
The premium for the policy was added to the face of the
sales contract for the car, and the contract was later
EXHIBIT MAf

assigned by Streator Chevrolet to GMAC, making GMAC the new
beneficiary under the policy.
At the time Martinez purchased the insurance, he did
not learn about the exclusion for pre-existing conditions•
Streator98 agent, Mr* Elton, did not ask him about his past or
present health. Martinez was not asked to sign the credit
Insurance application, which stated the coverage exclusions,
nor was he given a copy of the Insurance application or the
certificate of Insurance, although it was Streator's normal
business practice to have an Insured sign the application
and to give him a copy of the Insurance certificate. Apparently, Mr. Elton was unable at the time to find the blank
credit insurance certificates. Nor were any of the policy
exclusions explained to Martinez orally*
The Insurance certificate states the policy exclusions. The "pre-existing condition* exclusion provides: "No
insurance is provided hereunder * * - if disability results
from . . • Injury sustained or sickness contracted for which
medical diagnosis or treatment was required . . . within six
months prior to the effective date [of coverage] of this
certificate and which causes a loss within six months after
such effective date*"
Although It is undisputed that Martinez suffered
from high blood pressure prior to his purchase of the Insurance
policy, Martinez, did not misstate or misrepresent his state
of health* On the contrary* the agent who filled out the
Great Equity insurance application form seemed totally indifferent to Martinez1 prior health*
^
Martinez made two monthly payments on the car
prior to suffering a complete kidney failure which resulted
in his total disability. He then made a demand on the
insurance company to pay the balance owing on the car to
GMAC* Pending the outcome of the insurance company's investigation, GMAC deferred collection on its contract. As a result
of its investigation. Great Equity denied coverage on the ground
that Martinez had suffered high blood pressure prior to his
purchase of the car, and the subsequent kidney failure fell
within the exclusionary clause of the policy for pre-existing
diseases.
GMAC then brought this suit against Martinez.
Martinez filed a third-party complaint against Great Equity
alleging that it was liable under the insurance contract for
the car payments. Great Equity admitted the existence of
the insurance contract and denied coverage under the preexisting sickness exclusion*
The trial court granted judgment against Martinez
as a matter of law on the contract for the purchase of the
car, and awarded GMAC $4,717.50 plus interest, costs, and
attorney's fees* On the issue of Great Equity's lia-""*
bility under the policy, the trial court submitted seven
special interrogatories to the jury. Based on the answers

to those interrogatories, the trial court entered judgment
for Great Equity.
In 1961 the Legislature enacted the Model Act for
the Regulation of Credit Life Insurance and Credit Accident
and Health Insurance. Laws of Utah 1961, Chap. 67, $1. That
act is now found in Title 31, Chap. 34 of U.C.A., 1953. Section
31-34-6(1) states:
All credit, life insurance and credit; accident and health, insurance shall be evidenced
by an individual policy, or in the case of
group insurance by a certificate of insurance,
which • • . shall be delivered to the debtor.
Subsection 2 of that provision specifies what information must
be included in the individual policy or group certificate
issued to the debtor. Among other things, the policy or
group certificate must state the "term and coverage including
any exceptions, limitations and restrictions•"
Credit life and accident insurance are generally
contracts of adhesion which are not negotiated at arms
length and which usually contain various provisions for
protection of the interests of the insurance company.
Because those who purchase such policies rely on the assumption
that 'they are covered by the insurance they buy, the Legislature, in the interest of fair dealing, has deemed it
mandatory that an Insured be given a copy of the policy so
that he can take whatever action is appropriate to protect
his Interests and be assured that the coverage which he
thinks he has contracted for is actually provided.* It is
not consonant with our statute for an Insurance company to
accept premiums and then deny liability on the ground of an
exclusion of which the Insured was not aware because the
insurance company had never informed him of the exclusion
or given him the means to ascertain its existence.
The purpose of the statutory provision is plain:
the insured is entitled to be informed in writing of the
essential terms of the insurance contract, especially the
exclusionary terms. Because of the reliance that people place
on credit insurance policies to mitigate the hardships that
often result from inability to pay a debt, the policy of the
law is to prevent mistake or misunderstanding as to the terms
of the insurance contract, or what in some cases may amount
to sharp practice. Frieze v. West American Insurance Co.,
188 F.2d 331, 334-335 (8th Cir. 1951) (applying California
law). See also Colvin v. Louisiana Hospital Service, Inc«, La.
App.f 321 So. 2d 416 (1975)j Traders & General Insurance Co.
v« Pacific Employers Insurance Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d 158,
278 P.2d 493, 495 (1955).
In view of these reasons and the unequivocal
nature of the duty imposed by $31-34-6, we hold that an
-T-
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insurance company is estopped from relying upon an exclusion
in a policy if the company has failed to deliver the policy
or certificate of insurance to the insured or any other
document stating the exclusionGardner v. League Life Insurance Co., 48 Mich. App.
574, 210 N.w.2d 897 (1973), was decided under facts almost
identical to those that exist in the instant case and is
wholly consistent with the result we reach. The insurer
sought to avoid paying on a credit insurance policy because
of an exclusionary clause In the policy which had never been
delivered to the insured*. At the time Michigan had a credit
insurance act similar to Utah's credit life and accident
insurance act* The particular provision which imposed the
duty to deliver a copy of the policy was identical to
$31-34-6(1).. The court construed the Michigan statutory
provision to mandate delivery and held that the insurance
company was- estopped from relying on the policy exclusion
because of Its failure to comply with the act.
Hayes Trucfc Lines. Inc. v. Investors Insurance Corp..
257 Or. 602,. 525 P.2d 1289 (1974), is also squarely on point.
The insurer denied liability on an exclusion in a credit
insurance policy for a pre-existing disability. The Insurance agent had not inquired as to the status of the Insured's
health; the Insured had not signed or received an application
for insurance or a certificate of insurance; and the insured
had relied on representations, by the insurance company that
he was insured* The court held that as a matter of law
the insurance company was liable*
The result reached in the instant case ie also consistent with the rule laid down by a number of courts that a
certificate of Insurance or other literature given an insured
describing the coverage controls over a master policy sot
delivered to the insured. E.g.. Life Insurance Co* v. Lee,
519 P.2d 475 (6th Cir. 1975); Lecker v. General American Life
Insurance Co., 55 Hawaii 624, 525 P.2d 1114 (1974); Republic"""
National Life Insurance Co. v. Blann, 400 S.W.2d 31 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966). See also 6 A.L.R. 4th 839-842 (1981), and
cases discussed therein.
Great Equity in this case concedes that Martine2
did not sign the application for insurance, which contained
the exclusionary language and was made out by its agent at
the time Martinez paid his premium, and that Martinez was
not told at that time, or at any time, -of the exclusion.
It asserts, however, that it sent Martinez a copy of the
policy. Great Equity's contention that the policy was sent
to Martinez is supported by the testimony of its agent who
testified that although he could not recall the transaction
with Martinez, a copy of the policy is normally sent two or
three days after the paper work of the sale is completed.
No. 18072
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On the other hand, Martinez and his father testified that
no copy was received.
The jury was not requested in so many words to
determine specifically whether the policy had been sent.
However, a special interrogatory did pose the question
whether Martinez either knew or should have known about the
exclusion. On this question, the jury did not answer in
Great Equity's favor. Since Great Equity had the burden of
proof and of persuasion with respect to establishing the
exclusion and because Great Equity failed to meet those
burdens, the only logical conclusion is that Martinez did
not know, nor should he have known of.the exclusion.
Finally, Great Equity contends that defendants
should have been aware of the exclusion because it is "standard
in the industry." That conclusion does not follow. Martinez
had not worked in the insurance industry and could hardly
have known what was standard in the industry. Further, Great
Equity's argument would, for practical purposes, render
531-34-6 a nullity since the contention that proof of what
is standard in the industry is sufficient to bind an insured
is fundamentally at odds with $31-34-6. *[T]he need for
notice is beyond peradventure." Gardner v. League Life
Insurance Co.. supra. 48 Mich. App. at 577, 210 N.w.2d at

891T
Although estoppel is usually a factual defense, it
may be established as a matter of law to preclude an insurance
company from relying on an exclusion in a credit life and
accident policy. Hayes Truck Lines. Inc. v. Investors Ins.
Co., 269 Or. 565, 525 P.2d 1289 (1974); Scribner v. Equitable
Life % Casualty Insurance Co.. 257 Or. 602, 481 P.2d 76
(1971). On the facts of this case, Great Equity is estopped
as a matter of law from denying coverage under the policy.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the
case remanded for entry of judgment against Great Equity and
in favor of Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera.
Costs to appellants.
WE CONCUR:

OAKS, Justice:

(Dissenting)

I cannot agree that the insurance carrier is "estopped
as a matter of law" from relying on the exclusions in its policy
because a copy of the policy was not delivered to the debtorinsured. Although the Model Act directs that a copy be
delivered to the debtor-Insured, U.C.A., 1953, S 31-34-6(1),
nothing in that section or in the Act as a whole directs or
indicates an intent to rescind the policy exclusions if this
requirement is not met* That drastic result should not be
decreed by this Court without explicit legislative direction.
The majority's decision Injects a new provision into
insurance contracts9 a provision whose effects are almost
impossible to gauge but potentially far-reaching- An agentfs
failure to deliver a policy or certificate would apparently
rescind all policy exclusions, since the majority's reasoning
offers no basis to distinguish one exclusion from another*
On this insurance contract, that would extend the policy coverage to disabilities resulting from intentionally self-inflicted
injuries* flight in nonscheduled aircraft, war or military
service, and normal pregnancy•> As to life insurance, It would
Impose coverage for deaths caused by suicide*
The potential effects of the majority's decision
are even more far-reaching- The rationale that the Insured
"is entitled to be Informed in writing of the essential terms
of the insurance contract" apparently applies to terms of limitation, as well as to terms of exclusion* Consequently, the"
majority's holding suggests that an Lnarxrnd who could convince
a jury that he had not received a copy .of the policy might
enforce this policy without regard to its provisions on maximum
age, gainful employment, limitation of one death benefit in
the case of cosigners, and even to some unspecified point beyond
the dollar limits of $15,000 on death benefits and disability
payments- Other policy provisions, such as the critical definition of "total disability,1' would also seem to come under
the majority's interdiction if sought to be applied against
the insured.
The uncertainties introduced by the majority's decision will provoke litigation and frustrate the kind of loss
predictions that are essential to the stability of the insurance
industry*
The district court's judgment in favor of the insurance company on the basis of the policy exclusion should be
affirmed*
Hall, Chief Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Oaks.

\T^>

* o r*»-»o
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EXHIBIT "BM

FILED IN CLEPK'S OFFICE
Salt Lakr County, Utah
Jay E. Jensen
William J. Hansen
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants
Great Equity Life Insurance Company,
Streator Chevrolet, Barrutia and
Jensen
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 355-3431

SEP 2:, 1981
w. r^y

g, -s. e y zt<t o.«.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION, a Nev York
corporation,
Plaintiff,

HECTOR MARTINEZ and
MANUEL M. RIVERA,

JUDGMENT

Defendants,

vs.
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS,
STREATOR CHEVROLET COMPANY,
INCORPORATED; AL BARRUTIA,
BRENT H. JENSEN, and E. E.
ROSEBOROUGH,

Civil No. C-79-4797

Third-Party
Defendants

The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial
in the above-entitled court before the Honorable Dean E. Condor,
on September 3, 1981.

The plaintiff appeared through its counsel,

Jay V. Barney, the. defendants by their counsel, Mark S. Miner;
and the third-party defendants through their counsel, William J.
Hansen.' A jury was duly impaneled.

Evidence was introduced, the

jury instructed, and the matter being fully argued, the case was
submitted to the jury, which upon due deliberation returned and
made the following:
SPECIAL VERDICT
We the jury in the above-entitled action, find from a
preponderance of the evidence, the answers to the questions propounded to as as follows:

EXHIBIT "B"

1. Was thare prasant in tha disability policy obtained
by tha daftndant a pre-existing condition exclusion which excluded
covarage if « reasonably prudent parson knew or should have known
of an injury or sicknass or if Hector Martinez knew or should
have known of en Injury or sicknass that required medical diagnosis
or treatment within six moncha prior to tha purchasa of tha policy.
Yes JC_

Ho

If your answer to question 1 was "yes," then answer tha
following questions.

If your answer to question 1 was "no" than

do nor anawar tha following questions.
2*

Did Hector Martinez know or should ha have known of

tha pre-existing physical condition exclusion referred to in
^ r>

question 1.
Taa

Ho

aseag Yes J>_

A

~—

Ho

*

3- Wae tha pre-existing condition exclusion referred
cp in question 1 a standard provision in tha industry such that a
reasonably prudent parson or Hector Martinez should have been
aware of tha provision
Yes JC_

Ho

If your anawar to question 2 or 3 was "yes," then answer
question 4. If your anawar to questions 2 and 3 was "no v " than
do not answer tha following questions.
4. Did Hector Martinez have an injury or illness for
which medical diagnosis or treatment was required.
Yes JC_

No

5. Did Hector Martinez know of the injury or sickness
or would a reasonably prudent person have known of the injury or
sickness and have sought medical diagnosis or treatment vithin
six months prior to purchasing tha disability policy.
Yes JC_

No

If you answered questions 4 and 5 "yes," then answer
question 6.

If you answered "no" to question 4 or 5 then do not

answer the following question.
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6.

Did tha injury or sickness of Mr. Martinez cause a

loss within six tnonths after the effective date of the disability
policy.
Yes JC_

No

If you answered question 6 "yes" then answer question 7.
If your answer to question 6 was "no" than do not answer the
following question*
7.

Did Hector Martinez become totally disabled?
Yes

X

No

WHEREFORE, upon notion of the defendants, and good
cause appearing,
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
third-party defendants have judgment against tha third-party
plaintiff on their complaint of no cause of action.
DATED this 1 i day of September, 1981.
BY THE COURT

District Court Judge

f??'
v

'ATTEST
w. jramjNii IVANS

7

M y C M

J

£93

EZHIBIT "C
MARK S .

MINER

Attorney for Defendants
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 363-1449
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IK AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION, a New York
Corporation,

i

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
HECTOR MARTINEZ and MANUEL
RIVERA,
Defendants,
GREAT EQUITY LITE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Third-Party Defendants.

)
]
•

Civil No. C-79-4797

On September 22,. 1983 at 8:00 a.m. there came on
regularly for hearing the Motion of" Great Equity Life Insurance
Company for clarification of judgment and the Motion of GMAC
and Streator Chevrolet for judgment to provide additional
attorney's fees.

Jay V. Barney appeared for GMAC, Mark S. Miner

appeared for Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera, and William F.
Hansen appeared for Great Equity Life Insurance Company.

The

matter was set for hearing on August 19, 1983 at 8:00 a.m. and
was contintued until September 22, 1983 at 8:00 a.m.

Jay V. Barney

gave Notice on August 25, 1983 that the matter would be continued

EXHIBIT "C

to September 1, 1983.

Mark S. Miner represented to the Court that

he verily believed that all matters were continued until the 22nd
day of September, 1983 at 8:00 a.m. by reason of the fact that
William F. Hansen was out of town.

The matter was duly argued

and submitted to the Court for its hearing and determination.

The

Court being advised of the premises herein, now makes the following
Order.
OHDEH
After argument of counsel and a review of the memorandums
and Supreme Court opinion in the above case, this Court finds that
the plaintiffys judgment against defendants Martinez and Rivera
still stands.

The Supreme Court only considered and reversed the

issue on insurance coverage between the defendants
Equity Life Insurance.

and Great

Since the motion for additional attorney's

fees was presented by a motion before this Court on September 1, 1983,
and defendant's counsel failed to appear at said hearing, this Court
will stand on its ruling at that time and grant the additional
attorney's fees.
DATED this

day of September, 1983.
BY THE COURT

DISTRICT JUDGE

-2-

±

^> /

EXHIBIT 'V
*1

f.j-MjT'c.r--

MARE S. MINER
Attorney for Defendants
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 363-1449

15 THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LASS COUNT!
STATS OF UTAH
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION, a New York
corporation.

':

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT

Plaintiff,
-vsHECTOR MARTINEZ, and
MANUEL X. RIVERA,
Defendants,
-vsGREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CHICAGO,
ILLINOIS: STREATER CHEVROLET COUPANT, INCORPORATED, :
AL aARHUTIA, BRENT H.
JENSEN, and S. C. ROSEBOROUGH,
Third-Party
Defendants.

Civil No. C-79-4797

Notice is hereby.given that Hector Martinez and
Manuel M. Rivera hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah from the Judgment and Order entered by the
Honorable Dean E. Conder on the 23rd of September, 1981,
which granted a Judgment of No Cause of Action based on a
Jury Verdict. The appeal is taken on the law and the fact
and appeal is taken on the Judgment in that the Jury rendered
a verdict of 3 to 3 in favor of the defendants. Said appeal
is taken further on the Order made and entered on October 5,
1981, In which the Court granted a motion dismissing Streater

EXHIBIT "D"

32S

Qievrolet Company, Incorporated, Brent Jensen and Al Barrutia, with prejudice.

Said appeal is taken on the law and

the facts; and the case and the cause in itm entirety.

„

I/SHA/

Attorney for
and Manuel H. Rivera
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING
I hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court
to:
Jay B. Barney, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants
4294 Poplar Street
Hurray, Utah 84107
Dale J. Lambert. Esq.
William J. Hansen, Esq.
Attorneys at Law
900 learns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
and that said Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court
was duly served according to law on this / /

day of

October, 1981.

0 <K
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Jay V. Barney
DAY, BARNEY 6 TYCXSEN
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
45 E a s t Vine S t r e e t
Murray, Utah B41Q7
Telephones
(801)
262-6800
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

AJ US

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION, a New Yorlc
Corporation,

3+'/

A*.

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs»
HECTOR MARTINEZ and MANUEL
RIVERA,
Defendants,
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, a t . a l . ,
"hird-Party

civil NO.

c-m-mn

Defendants.

The above-entitled case having coae hefors •the District
Court on the 3th day of September, 1981 for trial, sitting with
a jury, and Plaintiff, at the conclusion of ail the evidence,
having aade a Motion for judgement in its favor and against
Defendants, Hector Martinez and Manual Rivera, and the Court
having duly considered said Motion and having granted the sane,
and the Court having entered its Findings of Pact and
Conclusions of Law now herewith grants judgment in favor of
Plaintiff and against Defendants, Hector Martinez and Manuel
?.ivera in the sua of $4,717*50 together with interest from and
afi'jr Seotember 30, 1981 at the rate of fourteen and 55/100
percent (14.55 t) annual percentage rate until payment thereof
together «*ith costs of court in the amount of S127.Q0 and
attorney's fcas in the sum of $2,500.00.
DATED this

f

day of Dececaber, 1981.

*./s/ft

DEAN E. CONDOR
D i s t r i c t Judge
A"EST
Vt, C*"rnclNG T . A N 3

EXHIBIT "F*

EXHIBIT 'XT'

3 « K t^fcc

Jay V. Barney
DAY, BARNEY 6 TYCXSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
45 Ease Vina Street
Murray, Utan 84107
Telephone: 262-6800

OPHCu

FILES »N C~r

«;;, .-nty Oia.*«

Sir 22 i3o3

O«0un C***

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AMD fOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION, a New YorK
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED JUDGMENT

-fitfECTOR MARTINEZ, tt al (
Defandants.
GREAT EQUITY LirE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, et al,
Third-Party Defendants.

Civil No. C-79-4797

The above-entitled case having coee before the District
Court on the 8th day of September, 1981, for trial, sitting with
a jury, and plaintiff at the conclusion of all the tvidence
having nade a notion for judgment in its favor and against
defendants Hector Martinex and Manuel Rlvara, and the Court
having duly considsred said eotion and having granted the aaae,
and the Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, and the Court further having heard the notion of counsel
for plaintiff to eodify and aaend tne judgment to allow for an
additional $1,000.00 attorney's fees as a consequence of efforts

EXHIBIT "G"

axpandad by plaintiff's counsal in dafending an appaai by
dafandants and otharvisa baxng advisad in tha praaisaa, now
naravith grant* judgaant in favor of plaintiff and against
dafandanta Bactor Martina* and Manual ftivara, in tna sua of
$4,717.30, togathar vita intaraat from and aftar Saptaabar 30,
1981, at tha rata of 14.3S% annual parcantaga rata until payaant
tharaof, and coats of court in tha aaount of $127.00, and
attornay'a faaa in tha sua of $3500.00.
0AT2O this "LI-day of Saptaabar, 1983.

oaan s. usndar
District Judga
ATTEST
H.optfaiwpCi»r
m

— : • /

******

OCRTiriCATf Of OSUVCHt
I haraby cartify that a trua and corract copy of tna
foragoing Amandad Judgaant vaa placad with Tha ftunnar Sarvica
rrRS* for dalivary tot
*arfc S. Minor, Attornay for Oafandant
S2S ^awnousa Building, Salt Lafca City, Utah 84111
ttilliaa F. Banaan, Attornay for third-Party Dafandants
900 Kaarns Building, 136 South Main, Salt Lafca City, Otafr 84101
on this

day of Sapcaabar, 1963.

DAY &
D A V I D H. DAY

BARNEY

A T T O R N E Y S AT

JAY V. B A R N E Y

<*5

R O B E R T C. L I L J E N Q U I S T
P H I L I. I P B. S H E L L

EAST V I N E

MURRAY, UTAH

LAW

STREET
84107

TELEPHONE:
(801)

262-6600

J u n e 2 3 , 1986

Mr. William J* Hanson
Attorney at Law
900 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
S.L.C., UT 84101
Mark S. Miner
Attorney at Law
525 Newhouse Building
S.L.C., Ut 8411 1
Re;

General Motors Acceptance Corp.
vs. Hector Martinez vs. Great
Equity Life Insurance.

Dear Bill and Mark:
On June 23f 1986, I went to the Court to determine the
status of Entry of Judgment and the Order heretofore submitted by
myself to Judge Conder.
Robbie advised that he recalled that the Certification Order
of Mr* Miner had been signed but could not recall on the
Judgment. I therefore checked with the clerk's office and could
not locate the Order or Judgment in process nor was the same
found in Judge Conder1s office.
I therefore provided the Judge with an original typed copy
from our word processor of the Order and Judgment and had the
same signed on June 23, 1986.
I do not know whether the Judgment and Order previously
submitted was signed following the hearing and could not be
located by the clerk with whom I spoke or whether the same has
been lost. It may well be that a judgment was signed before June
23, 1986. Inasmuch as there may be an appeal in this case, I
point this out to counsel for your review of the Court record
rather than relying on this document as being the first Entry of
Judgment.
EXHIBIT M H"

l<tfl

ooo'

Page 2

Because this same document had been previously submitted for
signature by the Court and represents the same document which was
in issue before the Court on Tuesday, June 17, 1986, I have
stricken the right to object within ten (10) days inasmuch as the
Objection concerning this has already been heard.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me*
Again, I advise you to check the court file to see whether a
Judgment might have been entered earlier than the 23rd of June,
1986.
Sincerely,
DAY & BARNEY

V^J^arney

(I

JVB:sw

St

OG^°

.!, W 30 !0 us AH f B6

MARK S. MINER
Attorney for Defendants
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone 363-1449
UTAH STATE BAR NO.A-2273.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

GENERAL MOTORS
)i
ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, a )
New York corporation,
]'
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF INTENT
TO APPEAL TO
UTAH SUPREME COURT

]

vs.
HECTOR MARTINEZ and
MANUEL RIVERA,

)
]1

Defendants.

)

vs.

Civil No. C-79-4797
Judge Dean E. Conder

]

GREAT EQUITY LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, STREATOR ]
CHEVROLET COMPANY, INC.,
AL BARRUTIA, BRENT H.
JENSEN, and E. ROSEBO ROUGH, )
Third Party Defendants.

TO THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF

AND THE

ABOVE NAMED

THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS, YOU AND EACH OF YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE
NOTICE:
1.

That this a t t o r n e y has diligently searched the Court files in t h e

above entitled cause and h a s been unable t o perfect his appeal b y reason of t h e
feet t h a t the proposed final judgment has not been siqned o r h a s been lost in t h e
EXHIBIT

M M

I

«0tf7O 4

Clerks office and has not been placed in the file; evidently, J a y V. Barney,
Plaintiff's attorney experienced the same problem. This attorney checked t h e
clerks file June 26th, 1986; and there was no record of t h e Judgment therein;
hence, an appeal therefrom

was not possible. Please see Exliibit "A" which is

annexed h e r e t o and by reference made a p a r t hereof.
2. In view of t h e continuing confusicxi t h a t has plagued this case;
You a r e

given notice

t h a t t h e defendant will appeal all orders and judgments

promptly as 90on as they a r e placed in the file.
3. You a r e further given notice

t h a t t h e Order in which Judge

Ccnder ruled t h a t the defendant Hector Martinez had been

tendered

money by

the Great Equity Insurance Company and t h e Order terminating interest will b e
appealed forthwith; therefore, you should not pay over any funds until this
matter is ruled upon b y t h e Utah Supreme Court; Should you do so you a r e acting
a t your peril.
Respectfully^

MARK S/MINER
Attorney for t h e Defendants
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone 363-1449

ooon&

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify t h a t I mailed, postage prepaid, a t r u e and correct
copy of t h e foregoing Notice of Intent t o appeal, on this 26th day of June, 1986,
t o the following:

William J. Hansen, Esq., 900 Kearns Building, 136 South Main

Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; and, J a y V. Barney, Esq., 45 East Vine
Street, Murray, Utah

84107.

Said documents was duly served according t o law

by United States Mail.

SALT LAKE COUNTY CLERK
P.O. BOX 1860
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110

3

MARK S. MINER
Attorney for the Defendants
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange PJace
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone 363-1449
UTAH STATE BAR NO.A2273.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

>

GENERAL MOTORS
ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION,
A New York Corporation,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
TO UTAH SUPREME COURT

vs.
HECTOR MARTINEZ and,
MANUEL M. RIVERA
Defendants,

Civil No. On03 6205

C71 - ????

GREAT EQUITY LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY
OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS,
Third Party Defendants.
Comes now

Hector

Judge Dean Conder

Martinez and

Manual

Rivera,Defendants

and

hereby' appeals the Order and t h e Judgment which was made and entered in t h e
above entitled Court on or about the June 23th 1986. These Defendants further
appeal all Orders and all Judgments t h a t have been made and entered by t h e
honorable Dean Conder; the above entitled Court having Certified t h a t said
Orders and Judgment

are

final

Orders from

which

an

appeal lies.

These

defendants specifically appeal from the Judgment granting attorneys fees in
favor of General Motors Acceptance Corporation and against Hector
and Manuel M. Rivera.

Martinez

Appeal is further taken from the Court's Order and

Judgment awarding Defendants "Nunc Pro Tunc" attorney fees; Judgment dated
December 4th, 1981; and signed February 5th, 1982; appeal is further taken from
EXHIBIT

M

J"

the Court awarding One-Thousand dollars attorney fees on September 27th, 1983;
b e c a i s e defendants Counsel failed to appear a t a hearing on September

1st,

1983; and appeal is further taken from the Order of the Court t h a t Great Equity
Life Insurance

Company of

Chicago

made a tender of a Judgment to

the

Defendants, no tender having ever been made; said Order having been signed
June 23rd 1986; Appeal is further taken from all orders, and from all Judgments
which wholly disposes of all claims in this case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

MARK S. MINER
Attorney for the Defendants, Hector Martinez and Manual M. Rivera
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND SERVICE
I hereby t h a t I mailed postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, on the

/}

day of July

1986, t o J a y B. J^arney, Attorney for General Motors Acceptance Corporation,
45 East Vine Street, Murray, Utah

84107 and t o William J. Hansen, 900 Kearns

Building, 130 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, Attorney for Great
Equity Life Insurance Company of Chicago, I further certify t h a t said Notice of
Appeal was duly served according t o lajw by^Jrited States Mail.

MARK S. MINER
Attorney for the Defendants
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone 363-1449
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FILEB IN CLMK'S OFFICE
Salt Lak« City, Utah

JAY V. BARNEY (0224)
DAY & BARNEY
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
45 EAST VINE STREET
MURRAY, UTAH 84107
TELEPHONE: 262-6800

AUG 18 1986
H. Oixcn KJn0la^C»erkard Dist. (Court
By

^

(MrnM)a
\N>

Deputy Cl<

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION, a New York
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

—vs—
HECTOR MARTINEZ and
MANUEL RIVERA,
Defendants.
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Third-Party Defendants.

Civil No. C-79-4797

The above-entitled case came before the Court pursuant to
notice on Friday, the 16th day of May, 1986, the Honorable Dean
E. Conder, Judge, presiding.

Mr. Jay V. Barney appeared on

behalf of plaintiff, General Motors Acceptance Corporation
(GMAC), Mr. Mark Miner appeared on behalf of defendants and Mr.
William J. Hansen appeared on behalf of third-party defendant
Great Equity Life Insurance Company of Chicago (Great Equity).
At issue before the court were the questions of interest,
attorney's fees and judgment to be entered as between defendants
and third-party plaintiff, Great Equity.

Also at issue were the

EXHIBIT "K"

&

&

claims of plaintiff for additional attorney's fees to be awarded
against defendants and the right of plaintiff to receive payment
from third-party defendant Great Equity as a satisfaction of the
obligation, which Great Equity Life may owe to defendant.
The claims of plaintiff had been brought before the court at
an earlier time and ruling thereon had been deferred for consideration of issues remaining between defendants and third party
defendant Great Equity.
Whereupon, the Court having heard the arguments of counsel
and having reviewed documents, as well as memoranda submitted,
and being advised in the premises, now herewith Orders:
1.

Plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment against

defendants in the same manner and in accordance with that certain
Amended Judgment heretofore entered in the above-entitled Court
on the 22nd day of September, 1983, namely for the sum of
$4,717.50, together with interest from and after September 30,
1981, at the rate of 14.55% annual percentage rate until payment
thereof and together with costs of court in the amount of $127.00
and attorney's fees fixed in the sum of $3,500.00.

Plaintifffs

claim for additional attorneyfs fees for services performed
subsequent to the date of that judgment is denied.
2.

That defendants Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera are

entitled to judgment against third-party defendant Great Equity
Life in the sum of $4,717.50, together with interest from and
after September 30, 1981, at the rate of 14.55% annual percentage

rate, accruing up to and including November 7, 1983/ and together
with costs in the sum of $742,85.

No attorney's fees are awarded

and the request of defendant for attorney's fees as against Great
Equity are specifically denied.
3.

That the offer in writing by Great Equity Life of

November 7 f 1983 f together with its submission of checks for
payment of principal/ interest and costs f constituted a tender
within the meaning of Section 78-27-1 Utah Code Annotated

(1953)/

and Great Equity therefore has no responsibility for interest to
defendants from and after November 7 f 1983.
4.

That inasmuch as plaintiff/ GMAC/ has judgment against

defendants in an amount greater than the judgment which defendants have against Great Equity Life/ payment by Great Equity
Life directly to GMAC of all or any portion of the judgment in
favor of GMAC and against defendants shall constitute a satisfaction to the extent of payment made of any portion of the
judgment existing in favor of defendants and against Great
Equity.
DATED this

l£

day of ($>l£***4/, 1986.

Distr
H

ATTEST

- DIXON HINDLEY

By .

OK***

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT OF OBJECTION
I, Jay V. Barney, hereby certify that I did cause a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order to be placed in the United
States mails for mailing to:
Mark S. Miner, Attorney for Defendants
525 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

William J. Hansen, Attorney for Third-Party Defendant
900 Kearns Building, 136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
on this

-gift day of May, 1986.

I further do herewith give notice that said Order was duly
delivered to the Honorable Dean E. Conder on the 30

clay of May,

1986 and that the parties hereto have 10 days in which to file
objections to the Order as to form or content and failing to do
so that said Order shall be entered.
DATED this Q.0 day of May, 1986.

\yf J. BarAey

~4"

~PT

*f&
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FILEB IN C U M ' S OFFICE
Salt Lake City. Utah

JAY V. BARNEY (0224)
DAY & BARNEY
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
45 EAST VINE STREET
MURRAY, UTAH 84107
TELEPHONE: 262-6800
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

gj*Q9w&C>

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION, a New York
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

hi

J

\\ o GJ$ ¥ ^ T

1\

Ci^l

--vs—
HECTOR MARTINEZ and
MANUEL RIVERA,
Defendants.
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Third-Party Defendants.

No.

C-79-4|797

The above-entitled case having come before the District
Court on the 8th day of September, 1981, for trial, sitting with
a jury, and plaintiff at the conclusion of all the evidence
having made a motion for judgment in its favor and against
defendants Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera, and the Court
having duly considered said motion and having granted the same,
and the Court having entered its findings of fact and conclusions
of law with respect thereto, and certain aspects of the case
having been further reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court, and
matters having been remanded to the District Court for further
EXHIBIT

M

L"

S
j
e>osfl"

decision, and the Court having considered motions and arguments
of counsel relative to proceedings occurring subsequent to the
entry of decision by the Court with respect to plaintiff, as well
as motions raised before the Court from the respective parties,
and being fully advised in the premises, now herewith grants
judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants and in
favor of defendants and against Great Equity Life Insurance
Company of Chicago, as follows:
1.

Plaintiff shall have and is herewith granted judgment

against defendants Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera, in the sum
of $4,717.50, together with interest from and after September 30,
1981 at the rate of 14.55% annual percentage rate, until the same
is fully paid, and together with costs of court in the sum of
$127.00, and for attorney's fees fixed at the sum of $3,500.00.
2.

That defendants Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera are

herewith granted judgment against defendant Great Equity Life
Insurance Company in the sum of $4,717.50, together with interest
from and after September 30, 1981, at the rate of 14.55% annual
percentage rate, which interest rate shall accrue on the principal sum at said rate up to and including November 7, 1983, and
defendants are further granted costs in the sum of $742.85, and
no attorney's fees are awarded.
3.

That any payment which third-party defendant Great

Equity Life may pay to General Motors Acceptance Corporation as a
consequence of these proceedings shall constitute, to the extent

-2-

&*&

of the payment thereof, a satisfaction of such portion of the
judgment of defendants' against Great Equity Life,
DATED this /ff

day of ^ e ^ s ^ ^ T 1986.

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
CLERK
By

\LC\^nh^f^
Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT OF OBJECTION
I, Jay V. Barney, hereby certify that I did cause a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Judgment to be placed in the United
States mails for mailing to:
Mark S. Miner, Attorney for Defendants
525 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

William J. Hansen, Attorney for Third-Party Defendant
900 Kearns Building, 136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
on this

^0

day of Mayf 1986.

I further do herewith give notice that said Judgment was
duly delivered to the Honorable Dean E. Conder on the JL/V^day of
May, 1986 and that the parties hereto have 10 days in which to
file objections to the Judgment as to form or content and failing
to do so that said Order shall be entered.
DATED this

'^

day of May, 1986.
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MARK S. MINER
Attorney for Defendants
525 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 363-1449
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION, a New York
Corporation,

WRIT UNDERTAKING BOND

Plaintiff,
-vsHECTOR MARTINEZ and
MANUEL M. RIVERA,
Defendants,
-vsGREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CHICAGO,
ILLINOIS, STREATOR CHEVROLET COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
AL BARRUTIA, BRENT JENSEN,
and E. C. ROSEBOROUGH,
Third-Party
Plaintiffs.

Case No, C-79-4797

WHEREAS, the plaintiff herein is seeking to obtain
possession of defendant's automobile; and,
WHEREAS, under the law, Hector Martinez is entitled
to possession of said automobile; and,
WHEREAS, under the law, Hector Martinez is entitled
to retain possession of the automobile which the plaintiff seeks to wrongfully take, and pending a hearing
of said cause on its merits; the defendant being entitled
to possession and seeking possession of said car in
order to comply with the law and retain possession of
said automobile; and,
WHEREAS, Hector Martinez's desires of having said
automobile and personal property delivered to him , and

EXHIBIT nN'

-2for an Order of Delivery of said property, and to comply
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures and the Statutes
therein;
NOW, THEREFORE, we, the undersigned, residents of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in consideration of
the premises, and of the delivery of the automobile to
the defendant herein, we do, jointly and severally, undertake and promise and acknowledge ourselves jointly and
severally bound to the plaintiff, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, a Financial Corporation, in the sum
of $6,000; that the said Hector Martinez shall duly
prosecute said action, we solemnly agree to pay costs
and damages, which may be awarded against him, and to
return the property to the General Motors Acceptance
Corporation, should the above-entitled Court order Hector
Martinez to do so,
DATED this

fL1

day of August, 1979,

^UQflgTINK LOPEZ, SOftETJT
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
0n tne

/ '?

day of August, 1979, there personally

appeared before me, Ramos Ortiz and Augustine Lopez, the
sureties of Hector Martinez and Manuel M, Rivera, in the

(il^^S^ii^^?
.ft vumx

* 'p?

AMKKICAN

I N S U R A N C E
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

\

,l_\>

0

\jPi

M O - i

THIRD

DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

SALT LAKE

STATE OF UTAH

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION,
A NEW YORK CORPORATION

679- W7

Plaintiff
UNDERTAKING ON CLAIM AND
DELIVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

vs.

HECTOR MARTINEZ AND MANUEL M. RIVERA

Defendant

WHEREAS, it is alleged by the Plaintiff in his complaint and affidavit in the
above entitled action, that the Defendant in the said action has in his possession and
wrongfully detains certain personal property, as follows, to wit! One (1) 1977 Chevrole
Ma 11 hit, 7 Annr, r<»df seHal no. 111171,77407 S6, bearing Utah license no. LVft 469
of the value nf THREE THOUSAND AND NO/100
•
nmrAPg rs 3000.00
^
belonging to the said Plaintiff, to the possession of which the said Plaintiff is lawful
ly entitled, or the value nf SIX THOUSAND AND NO/100
^ I b r c ($
6000.00
^
AND WHEREAS, the said Plaintiff, being desirous of having the said personal
property delivered to him and by endorsement in writing upon the affidavit, has required
the Sheriff of otaiaOoutrapcxtft
any County in the
, State of Utah,
to take the said property from the said Defendant,
NOW, THEREFORE, we the undersigned,
NATIONAL SURETY CORPORATION
consideration of the premises, and of the delivery of the said property to the said
Plaintiff, do hereby undertake and acknowledge to the effect that we are jointly and
severally bound in the sum nf
SIX THOUSAND AND NO/100
Dollars ($ 6000.00
) being double the value of said property, as stated in the
affidavit, for the prosecution of the said action, for the return of the said property t
the said Defendant, if the return thereof be adjudged, and for the payment to the said
Defendant of such sum as may, from any cause, be recovered against the said Plaintiff.
NATIONAL SURETY CORPORATION
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the
District Court above and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the said court as its agent,
upon whom any papers affecting its liability on this bond may be served, and its liabili
ty may be enforced on motion, without the necessity of an independent action. The motio
and such notice of the motion as the court prescribes may be served on the clerk of the
court who shall forthwith mail copies to the surety if his address is knoiro.
Date this

2

^th

day of

J^Y

19-ZL

-in-Fac

Annual Premium $. 60.00
360012-8-67

EXHIBIT "Of
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MARK S. MINLR
Attorney for Defendnats
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone
363-1449

IN T!iE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION, a New York
corporation,

SUPERSEDEAS BOND

Plaintiff,
-vsiiECTOR MARTINEZ a n d
MANUEL M. RIVERA,
Defendants,
-vs-

GRLAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CHICAGO,
ILLINOIS STREATER CHEVROLET COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
AL BARRUTIA, BRENT II.
JENSEN, AND E. C. ROSEBOROUGH ,
Third-Party
Defendants.

Civil No. C-79-4797

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That we, Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera, aa^
principals, and Emilio Ramos Ortiz and Augustine Lopez. a&j*
sureties, are held and firmly bound unto the above-napi**
defendants in the full and just sum of Six Thousand Dol

m

($6,000.00), together with interest and costs, to be paid
said plaintiffs and third-party defendants, their succeffi
and assigns, to which payments well and truly to be I
we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, and administrate
successors and assigns, jointly and severally by these pi
sents.
WHEREAS, lately in the Third Judicial Court in

and for Salt Lake County, in an action oendinc in said CAU*

EXHIBIT "P"

between palmtiffs and defendants and third party defendants,
a judgment was rendered against Hector Martinez and Manuel
M. Rivera, on the

day of

, 1981,

and the said defendants have taken an appeal to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah to reverse the said judgment in
the aforesaid action;
NOW, the condition of the above obligation is such
that, if Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera, shall satisfy
the judgment in full, together with the costs and the interest,
if for any reason the appeal is dismissed or the judgment is
affirmed, and shall satisfy in full such modification of the
judgment and such costs and interest as the Supreme Court
may adjudge and award, then the above obligation shall be
void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect.
The above-mentioned sureties submit themselves
to the jurisdiction of the Court and irrevocably appoint
the Clerk of said Court' as their agent upon whom any papers
affecting their liability may be served, and this liability
may be enforced by motion and upon such notice as the Court
may require without the necessity of an independent action.
DATED this JT7~^

day of

-2

£^J&-&U.J

, 1981.

T h i s Supersedeas Bond i s s u b s c r i b e d and sworn
t o b e f o r e me t h i s o2 / d a y

of

/&z/jh£e4

J

, 1981.

<AtM/[j^
PUBLfc F '
*Ww
ng at Salt trake City, Utah
Commission expires: /-^--i^-JV
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MARK S. MINER
Attorney for Defendants
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 363-1449

nteo m CVERK'S OFFICE
SALT l A r r ^ ' - m Y . UTAH

OCT

13 4 37 PH '83

H. DIXON
1X0N A.
:.. : _ . , CLI
CLERK
.3RD D'SL COURT

6Y

6^^w
iflfo#uig/
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION, a New York
corporation,

SUPERSEDEAS BOND

Plaintiff,
vs.
HECTOR MARTINEZ and
MANUEL M. RIVERA,
Defendants,
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS;
STREATOR CHEVROLET COMPANY,
INCORPORATED, AL BARRUTIA,
BRENT H. JENSEN, and E.C.
ROSENBOROUGH,
Third-Party Defendants.

Civil No. C-79-4797

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That we, Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera, as
principals, and Emilio Ramos Ortiz and Augustine Lopez, as
sureties, are held and firmly bound unto the above-named
defendants in the full and just sum of Seven Thousand Dollars
($7,000.00), together with interest and costs, to be paid to
said plaintiffs and third-party defendants, their successors

EXHIBIT "Q"

and assigns, to which payments well and truly to be made,
we bind ourselves, our heris, executors, and administrators,
successors and assigns, jointly and severally by these presents.
WHEREAS, lately in the Third Judicial Court in and
for Salt Lake County, in an action pending in said Court between
plaintiffs and defendants and third-party defendants, a judgment
was rendered against Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera, on
the ^ n 7 d a y of X ^ j ^ ^

1983, and the said defendants

have taken an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
to reverse the said judgment in the aforesaid action;
NOW, the condition of the above obligation is such
that, if Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera, shall satisfy
the full judgment in full, together with the costs and the interest
if for any reason the appeal isMismissed or the judgment is
affirmed, and shall satisfy in full such modification of the
judgment and such costs and interest as the Supreme Court may
adjudge and award, then the above obligation shall be void,
otherwise to remain in full force and effect.
The above-mentioned sureties submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Court and irrevocably appoint the Clerk of
said Court as their agent upon whom any papers affecting their
liability may be served, and this liability may be enforced by
motion and upon such notice as the Court may require without the
necessity of an independent action.
DATED this P^? day of September, 1983.

771a^A oil-ft

^>co-<MK>
MANUEL M. RIVERA, P r i n c i p a l

AUGT&TINE L O P E Z / S u r e t y

^SUBSKRIBED

)lPA{£~/./^i/

AND SWORN TO b e f o r e

, 1983.
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Rules of Practice
The Utah Supreme Court would like to remind
the practicing attorneys in Utah that Rule
2.9 of the Rules of Practice for District
and Circuit Courts needs to be strictly adhered
to.
Copies of proposed findings, judgments
and/or orders must be served on opposing
counsel before being presented to the court
for
signature
unless
the
court
orders
otherwise.
The mailing certificate should
be included on the findings, judgment and/or
order submitted to the court.
Notice of
objections to the findings, judgment or order
must be submitted to the trial court within
five days of service upon opposing counsel.
Rule 2.9 also requires that Judge retain
the findings, judgment or order for the 5
day period.
Unless Rule 2.9 requirements
aj*e met and the judgment or order is signed,
there is no final judgment or order which
can be appealed to the Supreme Court.

EXHIBIT "R"

